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EARL M. MALTZ*
"Constitutions should have their provisions so plain that it ivill be unnecessary for
courts to give construction to them; they should be so plain that the common mind
can understand them." From the congressional debates on the proposed four-
teenth amendment'
Democracy and Distrus? is a most impressive contribution to the under-
standing of the nature of judicial review. With it, John Hart Ely reaffirms that
he is among the most creative and articulate of modem constitutional
scholars. He shines most brilliantly in his criticism of other contemporary
theories of the proper role of the federal courts in adjudicating matters under
the Constitution. If, after reading Ely's arguments3 and the equally cogent
analysis of Robert Bork,4 one remains convinced of the propriety of judicial
intervention in cases such as Roe v. Wade,5 nothing that can be added in a
brief comment such as this is likely to persuade him to the contrary.
Similarly, Ely's attacks on classical interpretivismr6 also are skillfully
deployed for maximum effect.
7
However, Ely falters slightly in the construction of his representation-
* B.A., Northwestern 1972; J.D., Harvard 1975. Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ed Chase and Jay Feinman, who read earlier drafts of this
comment and made a number of helpful suggestions. Of course, the author retains full responsibility for any
errors that remain.
I. A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 160 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Hotchkiss).
2. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY].
3. ELY, supra note 2, at 43-72.
4. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. I, 1-20 (1971).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. ELY, supra note 2, at 11-41.
7. Some of Ely's arguments on this point are less than convincing, however. The ninth amendment, for
example, is relatively easy to deal with from an interpretivist perspective. On its face, the language of the
amendment does not create any rights; it simply states that the Constitution by its own terms does not take away
any rights that citizens might already have. Nothing in the amendment addresses the question of whether
Congress or the states can abridge these rights.
The equal protection clause poses greater problems for interpretivists; as Ely points out, one is constantly
faced with the point that if the framers had intended that the effect of the clause be limited to matters of race,
then they could simply have said that in the text of the amendment. The courts, however, are often faced with
analogous problems in interpreting vague statutes, and resolve the difficulties by reference to legislative history.
And while the legislative history of the equal protection clause is replete with references to discrimination on the
basis of race and national origin-not, as suggested by Ely. supra note 2, at 149, limited to discrimination against
blacks, see A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 223-25 (1967) (discrimination against
Chinese)-to my knowledge no one has found any references in the debates to specific nonracial discrimination
that would be prohibited by the equal protection clause. This suggests that one does not stray far from the intent
of the framers in limiting the reach of the clause to matters of racial discrimination.
Ely's arguments on the privileges and immunities clause, however, seem unanswerable. Like "equal
protection of the laws,'" the concept of "privileges and immunities" admits to no clear meaning on its face. But
unlike the equal protection clause, the legislative history of the privileges and immunities clause is so muddled
that one can find support for virtually any position. Compare ELY, supra note 2, at 22-30, with R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 5208-I 1 (1977). Thus, interpretivists are placed in an insoluble dilemma.
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reinforcement model of judicial review. For in considering the appropriate
role of the federal courts in the American governmental structure, he ignores
one of the most important aspects of that structure-the concept of dual
sovereignty inherent in constitutional federalism. Part I of this comment will
briefly examine the structural approach to constitutional adjudication, and
conclude that it is basically an acceptable methodology for giving content to
unclear constitutional language. Part II will demonstrate the importance of
issues of federalism to the application of the structural approach. Part III will
discuss the relationship between problems of federalism and the representa-
tion-reinforcement model developed in Democracy and Distrust.
I. THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS AND THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH
Ely's attitude toward the relevance of the intention of the framers suffers
from a kind of mild schizophrenia. At the outset he suggests that a "clause-
bound interpretivism"-a mode of analysis focusing solely on the words and
specifically expressed intention of the framers-would, if feasible, be the
most efficacious mode of constitutional interpretation. But, once Ely con-
cludes that adherence to pure interpretivism is impossible due to both the
open-ended language of certain clauses and the lack of clarity of the relevant
legislative history, discussion of the intent of the framers virtually disappears
from his arguments.
The mere fact that the text and legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment are ambiguous does not, however, necessarily vitiate the impor-
tance of the search for the intent of the framers. When faced with an ambigu-
ous statute, courts do not simply abandon the search for legislative intent and
give the law an interpretation that the judges believe will further the common
good. Instead, the statute is interpreted in accord with the judges' best esti-
mate of the legislative intent--even though that estimate may not be entirely
reliable. Nor is any perceived need to look outside the text and history of the
Constitution itself in interpreting the fourteenth amendment inconsistent with
the search for legislative intent. Even accepting that the framers intended that
there be reference to nontextual ideas, they would have had some preference
among natural law, conventional morality, representation-reinforcement
values, and the other myriad concepts that have been suggested as appropri-
ate sources for constitutional values.
Thus, in theory one could base his approach to constitutional adjudica-
tion on a search for the intent of the framers, even in the face of the ambiguity
of some of the relevant provisions. As Ely demonstrates, however, in practice
the object of the search is likely to be very elusive, if not impossible to
identify. One reaction to this difficulty is simply to deny the relevance of the
original intention, arguing that constitutional adjudication is so fundamentally
different from other forms of judicial action as to be governed by entirely
different rules. But if intent is irrelevant and the text ambiguous, courts are
left with no constitutional source that defines the limits of their authority. Nor
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1981] FEDERALISM AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 211
is there any clear social or political consensus upon which judges can rely in
defining the judicial role.8 Thus, under this theory, in choosing from among
the various conceptions of judicial power that arguably are consistent with the
American governmental structure, judges would be forced to rely on their
subjective values. The model ultimately selected may lead the courts to apply
some more or less objective standard to the interpretation of the relevant
constitutional provision; but, if text and intent yield no answer, then there is
no objective standard to guide the choice of the model itself.
To take this position is equivalent to asserting that the Supreme Court
derives its right to strike down actions of the other branches of government
not from the specific substantive provisions of the Constitution, but rather
from a more generalized authority to act as a kind of moral watchdog to
"protect fundamental values and the integrity of democratic processes." 9
Metaphysical questions of legitimacy aside, one cannot objectively demon-
strate that such a structure is a "bad" form of government. One can only note
the inconsistency of this structure with the illusion-carefully fostered by the
courts-that judges are in fact enforcing specific constitutional provisions and
point out, as Ely does, the institutional unsuitability of the courts to perform
the function assigned to them by commentators who deny or downplay the
relevance of the intention of the framers. If one is to escape these problems,
then intent must be the touchstone of constitutional analysis.
On its face, the Ely model seems to have little connection to the intent of
the framers. One might argue that the representation-reinforcement concept
simply urges judges to adopt and enforce those philosophical ideals that are
consistent with Ely's particular vision of representative democracy.'0 But in
fact, the process by which he develops his model closely resembles standard
techniques of statutory interpretation. When faced with an unclear provision
in a statute, courts are admonished to interpret the particular section in light
of "the provisions of the whole law, and ... its object and policy."" The
mode of constitutional adjudication adopted by Ely operates in much the
same fashion; faced with ambiguous constitutional provisions, Ely attempts
to give content to those provisions by reference to the structure of the docu-
ment as a whole.
The structural approach can therefore be defended on a theory of im-
puted intent. While the substantive results reached by application of struc-
8. Compare Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. I, 8 (1971)
(courts should enforce only those rights which can be found in constitutional text and history) with Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 237 (1980) (text and original history
neither necessary nor sufficient condition for constitutional decision-making).
9. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 234-38
(1980).
10. See generally Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitu-
tional Theory, 89 YALE L. J. 1037 (1980).
!1. United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 121 (1850). See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421
U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, I1 (1962).
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tural analysis may not conform precisely to the subjective intentions of the
framers, the drafters of the relevant constitutional provisions are chargeable
with knowledge that such an approach might be employed to resolve ambigu-
ities. By leaving various provisions unclear in the face of such knowledge, the
framers must be viewed as accepting at least the possibility that structural
analysis would be applied to give content to those provisions. Thus, even
accepting the relevance of original intention, Ely's basic approach is an
acceptable (though not inevitable'2) response to the problem of interpreting
ambiguous constitutional provisions.
To accept the basic idea of a structural approach is not necessarily to
accept Ely's ultimate conclusions, however. To correctly apply a structural
model, one must consider all of the important elements of the American
constitutional scheme. As part II of this comment will demonstrate, the
representation-reinforcement concept is defective in its failure to take into
account a critical aspect of the constitutional system-the concept of federal-
ism.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERALISM
Ely clearly views the main structural problem in constitutional adjudica-
tion to be the allocation of authority between the political branches of
government and the courts. He describes the task of the constitutional theo-
rist in the words of the late Alexander Bickel:'3
The search must be for a function ... which is peculiarly suited to the capabilities
of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the courts do not
assume it; which can be so exercised as to be acceptable in a society that generally
shares Judge Hand's satisfaction in a "sense of common venture"; which will be
effective when needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the
quality of the other departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and
burden of their own responsibility.
Ely's description of the problem would be appropriate if he were con-
cerned with the interpretation of written constitutions generally; however, it
is fatally deficient as a description of the task of the courts in the specific
12. By applying other equally conventional modes of statutory analysis to the problem of constitutional
interpretation, one might generate results quite different from those reached through structural analysis. For
example, noting that constitutional constraints are the exception rather than the rule (at least with respect to
state governmental action), one might argue that, like statutes in derogation of the common law, constitutional
limitations should be construed narrowly. Cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910) (stating rule
with respect to statutes in derogation of common law).
While entirely plausible on its face, this approach would command few modem adherents. The legislative
history of the fourteenth amendment expresses only one intention clearly and consistently: that states should
not discriminate on the basis of race or national origin. If the narrow construction theory were applied, the
amendment would be interpreted only to prohibit such discrimination. Thus, cases resting on incorporation of
the first amendment-among others--would have to be abandoned. Further, since the legislative history of the
equal protection clause suggests that no prohibition on the use of "separate but equal" facilities was intended,
see Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). even Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), would be threatened. Few would be willing to embrace a doctrine with
such extreme consequences. But see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
13. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962).
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context of a national constitution. From a structural perspective, this distinc-
tion makes little difference in cases involving judicial review of federal action;
these cases can appropriately be conceptualized in terms of allocation of
authority between the political and judicial branches. The American concept
of dual sovereignty, however, complicates the analysis of judicial review of
state governmental action.
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo 4-- one of the group of reapportionment cases
decided on the same day as Reynolds v. Sims' 5-is an instructive example.
Applying the rule of Reynolds, the Court in Lomenzo held that the New York
state legislature was required to be apportioned on the basis of the one per-
son, one vote standard. Since the apportionment scheme established by the
state constitution did not meet this standard, the relevant provisions were
found to violate the equal protection clause.
Ely's defense of cases such as Lomenzo is based upon the proposition
that legislators cannot be trusted to supervise the conditions of their own
elections. 6 Even prior to the decision in Lomenzo, however, New York law-
makers were not free to control the means by which seats in the legislature
were apportioned; the state constitution prescribed detailed rules for deter-
mining the make-up of the State Assembly and Senate. 7 Further, as in the
federal system, the state courts, rather than the legislature, had the final word
in interpreting the New York constitution; and in exercising the function of
judicial review under the state constitutional provisions dealing with appor-
tionment, the state courts had been extremely active, closely supervising the
legislature in the implementation of these provisions. 8 Thus, while prior to
Lomenzo the New York legislature was organized under criteria that deviated
significantly from the one person, one vote standard, the legislators were
hardly in a position to "chok[e] off the channels of political change to insure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out";19 they had no more freedom
in this regard prior to Lomenzo than after that case was decided. The main
effect of Lomenzo was to replace constraints based on local standards imple-
mented by state court judges with other constraints devised by federal judges
using national standards.
Lomenzo plainly demonstrates that when a state constitutional provision
is invalidated, federal judicial intervention cannot appropriately be described
14. 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
16. ELY, supra note 2, at 103, 120.
17. For a detailed discussion of these rules, see Silva, Apportionment in New York, 30 FORDHAM L. REV.
581 (1962).
18. See In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198,52 N.E.2d 97,43 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1943); In re Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E.
545, 160 N.Y.S. 362 (1916).
19. See ELY. supra note 2, at 103.
20. Lomenzo was by no means unique in this regard; three of the other apportionment cases decided the
same day struck down state constitutional provisions. Lucas v. Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713
(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656 (1964).
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in terms of a transfer of decision-making authority from the political branches
to the judicial branch of government. Indeed, this description is not entirely
accurate even when a state statute, rather than a constitutional provision, is
the subject of federal constitutional attack. O'Brien v. Skinner2 1 illustrates
this point. O'Brien involved New York's denial of absentee ballots to certain
persons detained while awaiting trial or pursuant to misdemeanor convic-
tions. This denial was challenged in state court under both the New York and
federal constitutions. 22 The New York Court of Appeals rejected the chal-
lenge,23 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state law violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Unlike Lomenzo, O'Brien invalidated standards that were legislatively
created, and thus can appropriately be viewed as adding to the constraints on
legislative discretion. But O'Brien also effectively neutralized the state judi-
cial decision that the statute at issue was within the bounds prescribed by
the local constitution. Of course, since the Supreme Court passes only on
federal questions, the decision of the New York court on this point remained
formally intact. The holding in O'Brien, however, rendered the local stand-
ards on the issue entirely irrelevant; all courts-state and federal-are re-
quired to apply the more stringent national standard2 Thus, O'Brien in effect
limited an important power of state courts-the power to determine the rela-
tionship between the courts and the legislature on a particular issue.
In short, one cannot fully and accurately describe and evaluate the insti-
tutional effects of federal judicial review in terms of the allocation of authority
between the political branches and the courts. The selection of certain rights
and groups for special constitutional protection also has significant conse-
quences for the division of power between the state and national governments
generally. Necessarily, any process that affects this division of power raises
important issues of federalism.
If, like Ely, one seeks to derive the appropriate limits on the power of the
Supreme Court from an examination of the structure of American govern-
ment, issues of federalism should play a prominent role in the analysis. As Ely
himself points out, the Constitution as originally enacted was largely con-
cerned with defining the respective spheres of authority of the state and
national governments.26 The powers of the executive and legislative branches
21. 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
22. The state law claims were apparently based on explicit guarantees of the right to vote contained in the
New York Constitution. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 31 N.Y.2d 317, 321, 291 N.E.2d 134, 137, 338 N.Y.S.2d 890,
894 (1972) (Fuld, C. J., dissenting), citing N.Y. CONST. art. II, §§ 1. 4, 5, rev'don other grounds, 414 U.S. 524
(1974).
23. O'Brien v. Skinner, 31 N.Y.2d 317, 291 N.E.2d 134, 338 N.Y.S.2d 890, (1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 524
(1974).
24. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
25. The O'Brien Court never identified the precise standard of review that the Court was applying to the
New York law; the majority suggested that the law would not survive even the most deferential standard. See
414 U.S. at 530 (statute "'wholly arbitrary"). Whatever standard the Court applied was, however, plainly more
stringent than that employed by the New York court; given the lack of any factual dispute, there is no other
explanation for the reversal of the state court.
26. See ELY, supra note 2, at 90.
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of the national government were specifically and relatively narrowly
defined;27 by contrast, state power was left almost unlimited, with very few
substantive constraints. The overall picture is one in which each state is left
largely sovereign, with primary responsibility for providing for the govern-
ance and well-being of its local citizenry. If any doubt remained from the
original text of the Constitution, that doubt was removed by the tenth
amendment, which reaffirmed both the limited nature of national govern-
mental power and the general authority of the states over most matters.
Of course, the Civil War amendments had some effect on American
federalism. Certainly they must be viewed as meaning something, and what-
ever that "something" is will restrict the actions of state governments as well
as providing a rich new source of congressional power.2 9 For example, in the
face of the history of the fourteenth amendment it would be difficult to main-
tain that states retain general power to discriminate against blacks.30 At the
same time, it seems inappropriate to construe the amendments in a manner
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (powers of Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (powers of President); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (powers of courts). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 329 (J. Madison) (Wright ed.
1961) (juxtaposition of powers of state and federal governments).
The concept that the federal government is sharply limited in its authority admittedly has become somewhat
anachronistic. While initially the commerce clause was interpreted as granting Congress a relatively narrow
range of authority, see, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (Congress may not prohibit interstate
shipment of goods produced by workers being paid less than minimum wage); United States v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (commerce clause does not give Congress authority to regulate manufacturing), in more
modern times the clause has been construed to grant Congress authority over a broad range of subjects. See,
e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (commerce clause gives Congress authority over loansharking);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (commerce clause gives Congress authority over practices of
businesses which sell goods which have moved in interstate commerce). But see National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress may not force states to pay minimum wage to government employees).
Section five of the fourteenth amendment has also been construed to grant Congress substantial new powers.
See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
But the expansion of congressional authority has not vitiated the importance of issues of federalism in the
consideration of the appropriate function of the Supreme Court. First, even under modern conceptions of
federal power, decisions affecting the basic structure of state government remain, at least to a large extent,
outside the ambit of federal control. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (fourteenth amendment does not give Congress authority to change voting age in
state elections). But cf. City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980) (Congress may exercise some
control over structure of state governments to remedy violations of fifteenth amendment); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (to effectuate guarantees of fourteenth amendment, Congress may outlaw use of
literacy tests as qualification for voting). Second, the interests of the states as sovereign entities are well
protected by the structure of Congress; members of Congress are elected to represent states (or parts of states)
and can therefore be expected to give careful consideration to the principles of local autonomy in determining
whether to federalize any given area of law. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITI-
CAL PROCESS 176-79 (1980). By contrast, if the Court can be viewed as having any constituency at all, that
constituency is national in nature. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands oftthe Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 981. 1042-49 (1979). This difference might lead one to defer to the national legislature when it overrules
a state on a matter traditionally viewed as being of peculiarly local concern, while at the same time denying the
courts the power to impose national constitutional standards for dealing with the same matter.
In short, even accepting the legitimacy of the vast expansion of Congressional power that has taken place in
the past half-century-a topic beyond the scope of this comment-one must still cope with important problems
of federalism in defining the role of the Supreme Court in the American constitutional system.
28. The primary restrictions on the powers of the states can be found at U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
29. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1562-64 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
30. But cf. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (fourteenth amendment does not ban all
discrimination against blacks).
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inconsistent with the basic concepts of American federalism. Even given the
premise that one cannot ascertain the precise nature of the rights
that the framers intended to protect through the fourteenth amendment, one
can be fairly certain that if Congress had intended to make fundamental
alterations in the states' status as quasi-sovereign entities, the amendment
would have been couched in terms other than equal protection, due process,
and privileges and immunities. Indeed, the supporters of the amendment con-
sistently denied any intention to alter the basic incidents of state
sovereignty.3I Thus, whatever one's theory of the nature of fundamental
rights and protected classes, it should be consistent with the basic concept of
dual sovereignty that undergirds the constitutional system.
Ely-like most other commentators dealing with the problem of defining
fundamental rights32 -nonetheless does not address problems of federalism in
constructing his model of judicial review. The next logical question is whether
proper concern for considerations of federalism would have changed Ely's
conclusions. The response to this question will vary depending upon precisely
which conclusion one is addressing. Part III of the comment will examine some
of the issues raised by problems of federalism.
III. FEDERALISM AND REPRESENTATION-REINFORCEMENT
A. Classification Problems
In general, problems of federalism will have little bearing on the issue of
which groups should receive special judicial protection under the Constituion.
At the core of the fourteenth amendment is the concept that denial of the right
to discriminate against a particular group-blacks--is not inconsistent with
the notion of state sovereignty inherent in the American governmental
scheme. Once this principle is established, the addition of a small number of
groups to the protected list will typically not be inconsistent with the basic
idea of state autonomy; while the expansion of the constitutional prohibitions
to include, for example, discrimination against women, will clearly impose
national restrictions on the freedom of action of local authorities, the addition
of these restrictions will not significantly alter the basic structure of federal-
31. See A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 156-57 (1967) (remarks of Rep.
Woodbridge); id. at 217 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
32. When other commentators on fundamental rights have addressed issues of federalism, they have
spoken in terms of "experimental" federalism--"the conviction that worthwhile reform will more likely take
place when individual states are allowed to experiment.., than when the Supreme Court binds them to
national standards of its own making." Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945,963 (1975). See also Tushnet, The Newer Property:
Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 261,279. This formulation suggests
that the main value in preserving state autonomy lies in efficiency; that given a common conception of "'the
good," allowing the states flexibility will result in a more efficient pursuit of that conception. It ignores a more
basic value inherent in state sovereignty-the value of pluralism. Rather than focusing on a common notion of
efficiency, the concept of pluralism is based on the idea that local groups should generally be permitted to
effectuate their own choices of basic values, even if such values differ from those of the nation as a whole. See
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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state relations.33 Further, if one accepts Ely's theory that the language of the
equal protection clause itself suggests a prohibition of some nonracial dis-
criminations, 34 then the only real issue is which other groups will be pro-
tected. And plainly, a choice to protect one group generally involves no
greater intrusion on state sovereignty than a similar choice to protect any
other group.
There is, however, a problem concerning discrimination against aliens-a
class to whose claims Ely would grant special constitutional solicitude.35 At
the outset, it is far from clear that such discrimination should be viewed as
presenting a fourteenth amendment problem at all. In focusing on aliens as
an undifferentiated group, Ely fails to distinguish between aliens who have
been lawfully admitted to the country and those whose very presence is
illegal. Both groups share those characteristics that, under Ely's model,
should lead to special judicial protection for their interests. Yet unless one is
willing to argue that the Constitution requires that the government must
generally grant all those benefits to illegal aliens that are granted to citizens-
a dubious proposition at best36-then an additional factor becomes critical:
the decision of the political branches of the national government to grant an
alien the status of a lawful resident. Given that Congress can freely choose to
37admit or not admit any given alien, there seems no good reason why an
admission could not be conditioned upon the renunciation of a nonfunda-
mental privilege of residency3 t-for example, the right to receive welfare
benefits from either the state or federal government. 39 Thus, the question of
the legality of a given discrimination against a resident alien whose presence is
33. Of course, if one were to interpret the equal protection clause to impose important constraints on many
different types of classifications, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27
(1976) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (advocating generalized balancing test), then the freedom of action of the states
might be so significantly restricted as to raise important issues of federalism.
34. But see note 7 supra.
35. See ELY, supra note 2, at 161-62.
36. Cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (state restriction on employment of illegal aliens does not
violate supremacy clause). But see Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E. D. Tex. 1978) (illegal aliens may not be
excluded from public schools); Kane & Velarde-Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limita-
tions on State Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS. CONST. L.
Q. 461, 484-88 (1978) (arguing that illegal aliens should be considered a suspect class).
'The fact that illegal aliens are "'persons" and thus within the ambit of the equal protection clause does not
necessarily imply that they should receive special constitutional protection. The key question is not whether the
equal protection clause covers illegal aliens, but rather what degree of protection that coverage implies. For
example, optometrists are persons, but discrimination against optometrists need only survive the rational basis
test. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
37. Congressional authority to determine which aliens may be admitted to the country is almost entirely
unfettered by the Constitution. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-96 (1977).
The Court has indicated that even when fundamental rights such as free speech are involved, it will
generally defer to the decision of Congress in matters involving immigration. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794-95
(1977). This position is not without its critics. See id. at 808-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. See note 37 supra.
39. Compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (federal government may restrict aliens' access to social
security benefits) rith Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (states may not restrict aliens' access to
welfare benefits).
For an argument that the Constitution should be viewed as significantly limiting the authority of the federal
government to discriminate against lawfully resident aliens, see Rosberg, Tire Protection of Aliens from Dis-
crinrtiatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. Cr. REV. 275. Compare Maltz, The Burger
Court and Alienage Classifications, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 671, 688-89 n.150 (1978) (attempted refutation of
Rosberg argument).
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illegal arguably should turn on the issue of whether Congress intended to grant
lawfully resident aliens the claimed right, rather than on interpretation of the
strictures of the fourteenth amendment.40
But regardless of whether such cases are appropriately analyzed in terms
of congressional intent or equal protection, considerations of federalism sug-
gest limits beyond which the federal courts should not go in limiting the ability
of the states to discriminate against aliens. One prime aspect of sovereignty is
the right to have governing decisions made by those whose loyalty lies with the
sovereign. Almost by definition, an alien's primary commitment lies not with
the state in which he resides, but rather with the nation of which he is a citizen.
Thus, any requirement that the states allow aliens to vote or hold policy-making
positions is inconsistent with this concept of autonomy. Accordingly, the
assertion by the Court that the Constitution does not impose such a require-
ment4' seems eminently defensible-even accepting the proposition that the
equal protection clause generally prohibits discrimination against aliens.42
B. Fundamental Rights
In some respects, the representation-reinforcement conception of funda-
mental rights is less intrusive on the prerogatives of the states than other
noninterpretivist approaches to constitutional adjudication. Almost by defini-
tion, the degree of sovereignty retained by the states is inversely proportional
to the extent to which their freedom of action is constrained by national
standards. Ely would leave the state governments great latitude in setting
substantive policies; by contrast, many other contemporary theorists would
view the Constitution as imposing more significant constraints on local
autonomy.
43
40. See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023,
1060-65 (1979). The idea of analyzing problems of discrimination against aliens in terms of federal power made a
brief appearance as an alternate ground of decision in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-83 (1971).
However, such analysis has been most noticeable by its absence in recent cases.
41. See Foley v. Connelie. 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647-49 (1973).
42. Acceptance of the basic idea that principles of federalism limit the applicability of the equal protection
clause in cases involving discrimination against aliens does not imply approval of the manner in which the Court
has applied that concept. The identity of those effectuating local policies will have little impact on state
autonomy, so long as the policies themselves are established by those whose allegiance is to the appropriate
state. Thus, if one agrees that in general discrimination against aliens should be subject to close constitutional
scrutiny, compare ELY, supra note 2, at 161-62, with Perry, supra note 40, at 1062-65, then cases such as
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), in which the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to an exclusion of
aliens from employment as public school teachers, must be viewed as wrongly decided.
43. See, e.g., Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,
1040-41 (1979) (states forbidden to make choices which offend values given high priority by society both
historically and contemporarily); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Func-
tion of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 709 (1976) (states may not transgress "conventions
of contemporary sociopolitical culture"); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L. 1. 221, 280 (1973) (states limited by -'conventional
morality"). These models intrude most deeply on state autonomy when they dictate the constitutionalization of
matters that have traditionally been viewed as being of peculiarly local concern. Perhaps the most prominent
example of recent years has been the designation of the right to marry as fundamental. See Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978); Lupu. supra, at 1023-26. Historically, the regulation of the conditions and incidents of
marriage has been exclusively a matter of state concern; indeed, out of concern for local prerogatives, federal
courts have traditionally declined to adjudicate domestic relations matters even when the requisite diversity of
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On the other hand, the imposition of national standards in some of the
areas that Ely designates as appropriate for judicial intervention generates
particularly difficult problems of federalism. Imposition of stringent national
standards on the structure of state government poses a uniquely severe threat
to the concept of state sovereignty. The framers clearly recognized this prob-
lem; in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton noted that a constitutional provi-
sion giving the federal government general authority over the electoral
processes of the states would have been "both ... an unwarrantable trans-
position of power and ... a premeditated engine for the destruction of the
[s]tate governments."4 The source of the special dangers to state sovereignty
inherent in regulation of governmental structure lies in the pervasiveness of the
effect of such regulation. In most cases, intrusions on the decision-making
authority of the states is self-limiting; for example, a federal statute preempting
local regulation of the apple industry would leave unaffected all state govern-
mental decisions not dealing with apples. By contrast, by determining which
groups will wield political power, the structure of the government will pro-
foundly affect state decisions in all areas of policy-making. Federal control of
this structure thus is a far greater limitation on local autonomy than, for
example, congressional determination of the wages to be paid to state
employees45 or the location of a state capita16-each of which has been found to
be an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty.
Of course, in the face of the guaranty of a republican form of government,
it would be impossible to argue that the Constitution embodies no constraints
on the structure of state governments. But as Ely himself recognizes, one
cannot rely on the guaranty clause alone to establish the one person, one vote
principle of Reynolds v. Sims. 47 Clearly, the framers viewed both the existing
state governments and the new national government as republican in form,48
notwithstanding their significant deviations from the one person, one vote
principle.49
Ely nonetheless defends the Reynolds standard, arguing that amend-
ments adopted subsequent to the drafting of the guaranty clause-specifically
the equal protection clause and the various amendments extending the right to
citizenship for federal jurisdiction was present. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Barber v.
Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859). Yet cases such as Zablocki not only deeply involve the federal courts
in issues of domestic relations, but apply a stringent national standard to a large number of the state regulations
in this area of law.
44. See THE FEDERALIST No. 59 at 395 (A. Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961).
45. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
46. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
47. ELY, supra note 2, at 123.
48. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 at 312 (1. Madison) (Wright ed. 1961) (state governments); id. No. 10 at
133-36 (J. Madison) (Wright ed. 1961) (national government).
49. The method of selection of the Senate is of course the most prominent deviation from the one person,
one vote concept in the structure of the national government. At the time of the framing of the Constitution,
among the state governments in which at least one house was apportioned on a basis other than population were
South Carolina, where each parish or district had equal representation in the state senate, J. MAIN, THE UPPER
HOUSE IN REVOLUTIONARY A.MERICA 115 (1967). and Maryland, where the upper house was selected by
electors who in turn were divided equally among the counties of the state, id. at 102.
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vote to certain specified groups-suggest a "line of growth" which leads to
the conclusion that one person, one vote is the appropriate standard.50 Insofar
as it relies on the fourteenth amendment, the argument is entirely conclusory;
there is nothing in either the text or history of the amendment which, a priori,
suggests that it should be interpreted to add to the strictures of the guaranty
clause.5 This leaves the amendments guaranteeing the right to vote to specific
groups-blacks, women, persons unable to pay poll taxes, and eighteen-year-
olds-as the source of the line of growth leading to the one person, one vote
standard. Reliance on these provisions might be termed an argument of
amendment by indirection; for unlike the fourteenth amendment, the inten-
tion of the framers of the fifteenth, nineteenth, twenty-fourth and twenty-
sixth amendments, as expressed in the plainest possible language, was crystal
clear-to extend the right to vote to specific, narrowly defined groups in
American society. By their terms, the amendments would leave the states free
to devise their own forms of government within the broad definition of
"republican," subject only to rather minor restrictions. Yet Ely would tie
these amendments together with the guaranty clause through the fourteenth
amendment to turn the system almost precisely on its head. A national stand-
ard would govern the most basic, important decision in any political system-
the allocation of political power-with the states left with responsibility only
for relatively minor details. Such a radical change in the constitutional struc-
ture cannot be fairly inferred from the mere extension of the right to vote to
specific groups.
Nor is the one person, one vote concept the only administrable standard
that is consistent with the general principles enunciated by the guaranty
clause. 2 For example, one might plausibly argue that the phrase "republican
form of government" requires that one (but not necessarily both) houses of a
bicameral legislature be apportioned by population. Of course, such a system
would be inconsistent with the idea that representatives of a majority should
be able to implement by legislation any policy that they deem appropriate.
Given the numerous historical deviations from this principle at both the state
and federal levels, however, strict majoritarianism can hardly be viewed as a
basic tenet of the American system.
Indeed, there is a certain irony in Ely's advocacy of the rigid one person,
one vote concept as a constitutional principle. His elaborate justification for
50. ELY, supra note 2, at 123.
51. Indeed, it has been argued with considerable force that such a reading of the equal protection clause is
totally inconsistent with the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 595-608 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see ELY, supra note 2, at 118-19 n.*; Van Alstyne. The
Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP.
CT. REV. 33.
52. Ely presses the administrability argument only after arguing that the line of growth of the guaranty
clause leads to the conclusion that the clause should be interpreted to require an apportionment scheme
providing at least "rough equality" among the voting power of electors. But even rejecting the line of growth
argument, adoption of the one person, one vote concept might be appropriate if no other readily administrable
standard was consistent with the basic thrust of the guaranty clause.
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extending special constitutional solicitude to groups other than racial minori-
ties turns on his perception that some such groups need special protection
because their claims will be consistently undervalued by the political process,
largely because of the prejudice or hostility of the majority.5 3 Yet the
Reynolds v. Sims standard to which he adheres effectively prevents states
from building such protection into the political process itself.
Consider, for example, a state in which city dwellers have historically
been hostile to local farmers and have shown an insensitivity to their inter-
ests. If urban communities contain a substantial majority of the population
and both houses of a state legislature are apportioned on the one person, one
vote principle, then legislation will tend to reflect only the interests of the city
dwellers. On the other hand, if one house is apportioned by geography-a
basis liable to favor farm interests-urban lawmakers would be forced to
consider and accommodate rural concerns to ensure the passage of legislation
by both houses. The resulting laws thus would more likely reflect an appro-
priate balance among the interests of all citizens rather than simply reflecting
those of the majority faction.
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that any particular form of
government is the appropriate structure for any given state. Rather, it is
meant to demonstrate that the undesirability of imposing a rigid national rule
on apportionment is not based solely on the inconsistency of such a rule with
the theory of state sovereignty; practical factors also suggest the desirability
of leaving state authorities considerable flexibility in adapting their respective
forms of government to local conditions. Thus, Ely's defense of Reynolds v.
Sims remains ultimately unconvincing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Almost inevitably, viewing constitutional law solely in terms of the con-
flict between legislative and judicial competence will lead to an overly expan-
sive reading of the fourteenth amendment. The problem is not that judicial
competence is irrelevant; plainly, in interpreting ambiguous language, one
would not wish to assign to judges tasks that they are institutionally incapable
of performing.54 To focus only on this issue, however, is to ignore the fact that
local autonomy is a key concept in the American system, and that finding a
value to be constitutionally protected erodes this concept by forcing national
standards on both the political and judicial branches of state governments.
Thus, while unlike Bickel's "wrong question," Ely's approach does beget an
answer, the answer is one that suggests many conclusions inconsistent with
the basic structure of American government.5
53. See ELY, supra note 2. at 135-72.
54. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (political question doctrine).
55. Compare ELY. supra note 2, at 43, 72, quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103
(1962).

